REPLAYZERO
PHASE 1 IS LIVE
SIGNATURE SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE

VALID SIGNATURE.
WRONG CONTEXT.
REJECTED.

Protect signed authorizations with explicit context, nonce validation, expiration rules, and replay-resistant verification patterns.

OPEN REPLAY LAB EXPLORE THE PROTOCOL
VALIDATION_TRACE / 001LIVE / PHASE 1
DOMAIN LOCKEDNONCE FRESHEXPIRY VALID
01
DOMAIN SEPARATION

Bind intent to one application context.

02
NONCE VALIDATION

Prevent a valid authorization from being consumed twice.

03
CONTEXT-AWARE AUTHORIZATION

Verify the whole payload, not just its signature.

01 / VERIFICATION FLOW

How replay protection works.

01

DEFINE AUTHORIZATION

Specify the application, network, action, account, unique nonce, expiry, and target program.

02

SIGN

Sign a canonical payload that carries the required context fields—not an ambiguous message.

03

VALIDATE

Check signature, domain, network, account, nonce freshness, expiry, action, and target.

04

CONSUME

Persist the nonce or authorization ID. A valid authorization cannot be used again.

02 / INTERACTIVE DEMO

ReplayZero Security Lab

SIMULATION / LOCAL ONLY
AUTHORIZATION INPUT
CANONICAL PAYLOAD
{
  "context": {
    "domain": "replayzero.online",
    "network": "solana:mainnet"
  },
  "authorization": {
    "account": "demo-wallet-7F3A...91C2",
    "action": "TRANSFER_AUTHORIZATION",
    "target": "program:replayzero.v1",
    "nonce": "rz-2026-000184",
    "expiresAt": "2026-11-04T18:00:00.000Z"
  }
}
SHA-256 DIGEST
7c12b4a2c0de6d44576e...
EXPIRATION STATUS
VALID / FUTURE
Digest is a payload commitment, not a digital signature and not proof of wallet ownership.
03 / ATTACK SIMULATOR

Break the context.

Each test runs against the generated payload and the in-memory consumed nonce registry. Every result is simulation data.

TEST A

ORIGINAL CONTEXT

Expected domain, network, nonce, and expiry.

TEST B

WRONG DOMAIN

Swap the application domain to malicious.example.

TEST C

WRONG NETWORK

Swap the network identifier to ethereum:1.

TEST D

REUSED NONCE

Submit an authorization ID already consumed.

REJECTED ATTEMPTS / 00   •   CONSUMED IDS / 00
04 / DEVELOPER TOOLKIT

Build with intent.

A compact reference for engineers designing application-level authorizations and Solana integrations.

01Replay Protection Fundamentals02Authorization Payload Format03Domain Separation04Nonce Management05Expiration Policies06Solana Integration07Security Checklist08Threat Model
05 / SOLANA SECURITY MODULE

Protocol signatures are not application intent.

Solana transactions use protocol-level signatures plus a recent blockhash or durable nonce for transaction processing. That does not make every transaction inherently vulnerable to cross-network replay.

Wallet-signed application messages are a separate surface. Bind them to an application-specific domain, validate program instructions, use a nonce or sequence number, and define expiry. Durable nonces solve transaction freshness; they do not replace application-level authorization state.

TRANSACTION / BLOCKHASHMESSAGE / DOMAIN + NONCE
06 / ROADMAP

The next layer.

DEMO DATA / LOCAL
PHASE 01
PAYLOAD STANDARD
LIVE
PHASE 02
SIGNATURE VERIFICATION
PLANNED
PHASE 03
DEVELOPER SDK
PLANNED
PHASE 04
SOLANA PROGRAM EXAMPLES
PLANNED
PHASE 05
SECURITY REVIEW
PLANNED